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FROM CARDOZO TO DWORKIN: SOME VARIATIONS ON 
PROFESSOR NELSON’S THEME 
LOUIS H. POLLAK* 
I want to express my thanks for the opportunity to participate in this very 
important conference and, in particular, to comment on the remarkable paper 
Professor Nelson has given us.  I think I am an accidental participant in the 
sense that my role as commentator today relates to the fact that Professor 
Nelson has found it useful—maybe just as a rhetorical device—to look to an 
article I wrote long ago, way back in 1959, as a bridge from the age of Cardozo 
to the age of Ronald Dworkin. 
The central issues that bring us together today are the same issues that 
were posed for our country one hundred years ago.  W.E.B. DuBois told us 
then that “the problem of the Twentieth Century [was] the problem of the 
color-line.”1  We enter the Twenty-first Century with that problem unresolved. 
The problem of the color line, and how American constitutional law was 
undertaking to address that problem half a century ago, was the central focus 
of my 1959 article to which Professor Nelson referred—Racial Discrimination 
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler.2  It may be useful for 
me to explain the setting that gave rise to the writing of the article. 
In the 1950s, I was one of a group of young lawyers (both law teachers and 
lawyers in practice) privileged to assist Thurgood Marshall and his NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund colleagues—Robert Carter, Constance Baker Motley, and 
Jack Greenberg (whom we will be hearing from later today)—with the 
campaign of Brown v. Board of Education3 and subsequent cases.4  My article 
 
* Louis H. Pollak currently serves as Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  In the past, Judge Pollak served as Dean of both the Yale and 
University of Pennsylvania law faculties.  From 1950 until he became a judge in 1978, he was 
associated, first as a volunteer lawyer and later as a board member and vice-president, with the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund.  This essay is taken from remarks made by Judge Pollak on 
October 10, 2003 in response to Professor William E. Nelson’s lecture. 
 1. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 34 (David W. Blight & Robert Gooding-
Williams eds., Bedford Books 1997) (1903). 
 2. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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was written in the summer of 1959, a few months after Herbert Wechsler 
delivered his famous Holmes lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, in which he expressed doubt that the Supreme Court’s 
recent major civil rights decisions, particularly Brown, were soundly anchored 
in defensibly neutral principles of constitutional law.5  Jack Greenberg, and I, 
and others committed to the correctness of Brown were much concerned by 
Wechsler’s challenge to Brown and felt that a prompt reply was imperative. 
What was the reason for our concern?  Was Professor Wechsler the first 
critic of Brown?  Of course not.  Professor Nelson has pointed out that 
criticism was common, but it was largely from expected sources—the 
Eastlands and the Talmadges and their fellow travelers.  But criticism from 
Herbert Wechsler was quite another matter.  Wechsler was, after all, a person 
of liberal persuasion who fully subscribed to the precepts of equality that 
undergirded Brown.  More importantly, Wechsler was a lawyer and a scholar 
at the pinnacle of achievement and influence in our profession.  As Judge 
Posner, himself a figure of commanding professional status, put it in 1995 in 
Overcoming Law: “[T]here is no longer anyone in the legal profession who has 
the kind of stature that a Wechsler achieved . . . .”6 
My article was written when I was a very junior law teacher at Yale, and I 
was tilting at a great and revered figure.  Was it an effective riposte to 
Wechsler?  At the time, some kind things were said about the article in some 
quarters.  Moreover, not long after the article’s publication, my elders and 
betters on the Yale Law School faculty did vote that I should be promoted to 
tenured rank—which I, in my self-interested way, felt to be an agreeable 
outcome.  But principles of full disclosure require me to acknowledge that, in 
recent years, more rigorous scholarly standards have been brought to bear that 
suggest that Yale’s 1950s Good Housekeeping seal of approval was a currency 
of marginal value.  Judge Posner observed that “[t]here was some scholarly 
dissent from Wechsler’s thesis.  It came primarily, as one would expect, from 
professors at the Yale Law School, the heirs of legal realism.”7  Judge Posner 
mentioned, dismissively, an article by Charles E. Clark, the eminent Judge of 
the Second Circuit and former Yale dean.8  Next, he characterized Charles 
Black’s celebrated article, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,9 as 
 
 4. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994). 
 5. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 21-22 (1959). 
 6. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 77 (1995). 
 7. Id. at 78 (footnote omitted). 
 8. Id. (citing Charles E. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L. REV. 660 
(1963). 
 9. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 
(1959). 
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“[t]he most eloquent scholarly defense of Brown,” but one ultimately 
dependent on “formalisms” which, apparently, Judge Posner found 
unpersuasive.10  And as for Pollak?  Judge Posner was underwhelmed: 
Louis Pollak rose to Wechsler’s bait and wrote an alternative opinion in 
support of the result in Brown.  To avoid having to examine the consequences 
of public school segregation, Pollak resorted to the unedifying lawyer’s tactic 
of shifting the burden of proof—requiring the school districts to prove that 
segregation was not stigmatizing and then finding that they had not carried the 
burden.  Of course not; they didn’t know they had such a burden.11 
So much for Pollak.  So I thought that 1959 article was buried until today, 
when Professor Nelson has disinterred it and said what appear to be nice things 
about it.  Suddenly, I find myself a link between Cardozo and Dworkin and all 
good things like that, and now for the first time I realize how smart I was in 
1959.  I feel like the hero of Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who 
inflates with self-importance when he learns that he has, unbeknownst to 
himself, been speaking prose all his life.12 
In my article, as Professor Nelson points out, I said a word in favor of the 
propriety of judicial invocation of philosophic convictions as an ingredient of 
constitutional analysis and decision.  I wrote that “judicial neutrality”—to 
which I subscribed—”does not preclude the disciplined exercise by a Supreme 
Court Justice of that Justice’s individual and strongly held philosophy.”13  
Professor Nelson argues that there is an antithesis between the Cardozo view, 
which looks to “sociology” rather than “philosophy,” and the Dworkin view, 
which draws very heavily on philosophy as appropriate and indeed obligatory.  
As Professor Nelson says, “Cardozo insisted that judges supplement the 
professional sources of law with an objectively verifiable analysis of societal 
needs and values.  Dworkin, on the other hand, would ultimately have judges 
work from their disparate views of proper political morality.”14  Professor 
Nelson finds that my 1959 acquiescence in the deployment of a judge’s 
“individual and strongly held philosophy” constituted a shift away from 
Cardozo’s limiting “objectively verifiable analysis of societal needs” and 
towards the expansive “political morality” which Dworkin was to explicate in 
subsequent decades.15  Curiously, however, the prime example that I gave in 
my article of a judge properly drawing on his own philosophy was Cardozo, 
 
 10. POSNER, supra note 6, at 78. 
 11. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 12. JEAN BAPTISTE POQUELIN MOLIÈRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME 51 (Yves Hucher 
ed., Librairie Larousse 1964) (1670), translated in TARTUFFE & THE WOULD-BE GENTLEMAN 
114 (H. Baker & J. Miller trans., The Heritage Press 1963). 
 13. Pollak, supra note 2, at 33. 
 14. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal 
Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. [insert page #], [insert pinpoint (12 in manuscript)] (2004). 
 15. Id. at [insert pinpoint (45-47 in manuscript)]. 
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announcing for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut that “freedom of thought and 
speech. . . . is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom.”16  That would seem to be a philosophic pronouncement of 
very considerable constitutional consequence. 
Having offered Cardozo’s Palko formulation as a proposition that lies in 
the realm of what Cardozo termed “philosophy” rather than in the realm that 
Cardozo termed “sociology,” am I undertaking to conflate Dworkin and 
Cardozo, and thus to say that their approaches to constitutional adjudication 
are not significantly different?  Not at all.  The Palko pronouncement is 
political philosophy.  What Dworkin wants judges to harness is moral 
philosophy.  The divergence between the two is substantial, and the 
constitutional jurisprudence of Holmes, whom Cardozo regarded as in major 
respects his teacher, offers examples of that divergence.  Said Holmes, in 
explaining law to law students in 1891: “[N]othing but confusion of thought 
can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally 
rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law.”17  And in 1918, in Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, dissenting from the Court’s invalidation of a 1916 federal statute 
barring the shipment in interstate commerce of products of child labor, Holmes 
said: 
But I had thought that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist 
in some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone and that this Court 
always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of 
policy or morals.  It is not for this Court to pronounce when prohibition is 
necessary to regulation if it may ever be necessary—to say that it is 
permissible as against strong drink but not as against the product of ruined 
lives.18 
With this let us contrast the way in which Holmes, the soldier-turned-
judge, ruminated about the greatness of the greatest of his predecessors.  On 
February 4, 1901, the centennial of the day that John Marshall was sworn in as 
the fourth Chief Justice of the United States, Holmes said: 
A great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary the 
figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his greatness 
consists of his being there.  I no more can separate John Marshall from the 
fortunate circumstance that the appointment of Chief Justice fell to John 
Adams, instead of to Jefferson a month later, and so gave it to a Federalist and 
loose constructionist to start the working of the Constitution, than I can 
separate the black line through which he sent his electric fire at Fort Wagner 
from Colonel Shaw.  When we celebrate Marshall we celebrate at the same 
 
 16. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). 
 17. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, reprinted in THE MIND AND 
FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 74 (Max 
Lerner ed., 1943) [hereinafter THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES]. 
 18. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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time and indivisibly the inevitable fact that the oneness of the nation and the 
supremacy of the national Constitution were declared to govern the dealings of 
man with man by the judgments and decrees of the most august of courts. 
  . . . . 
  . . . We live by symbols, and what shall be symbolized by any image of the 
sight depends upon the mind of him who sees it.  The setting aside of this day 
in honor of a great judge may stand to a Virginian for the glory of his glorious 
State; to a patriot for the fact that time has been on Marshall’s side, and that 
the theory for which Hamilton argued, and he decided, and Webster spoke, and 
Grant fought, and Lincoln died, is now our corner-stone.19 
That cornerstone was an artifact of Holmes’s philosophy—his political 
philosophy—informed by Holmes’s view of his nation’s history, which he had 
lived and helped to shape. 
Was the Holmes who venerated “the theory for which Hamilton argued, 
and [Marshall] decided, and Webster spoke, and Grant fought, and Lincoln 
died,” nevertheless right in contending that “nothing but confusion of thought 
can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally 
rights in the sense of the Constitution”?  In my view, the jury is still out on 
whether Holmes was right.  Holmes has, of course, formidable contemporary 
support.  Here again we may look to Judge Posner—this time to his 1998 
essay, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory: “I shall argue that moral 
theory does not provide a solid basis for moral judgments, let alone for legal 
ones.”20  The argument that powerful advocate then advanced was framed in 
compelling terms.  But of course, there are compelling counter-arguments, and 
not only from Ronald Dworkin.  With respect to that controversy I am not, 
today, prepared to enter summary judgment either way, but I do offer this 
 
 19. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., John Marshall, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES, supra note 17, at 383-85 (commenting on Chief Justice John Marshall). 
 20. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1637, 1638 (1998).  In Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), Judge Posner’s view received 
authoritative reinforcement.  The Court observed: 
  It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers [v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986)] was making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful 
voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.  The condemnation has been shaped 
by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the 
traditional family.  For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep 
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus 
determine the course of their lives.  These considerations do not answer the question 
before us, however.  The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to 
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.  “Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” 
Id. at 2480 (alteration added) (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
850 (1992)). 
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preliminary and intermediate submission: Whether moral philosophy can offer 
guidance for the resolution of major issues of constitutional law may find its 
most demanding test in the context of the legal issues surrounding the problem 
of race—the problem that DuBois, a century ago, insisted we confront. 
  Viewing the problem of race in moral terms is not new with Dworkin, nor, 
indeed, was it new when Brown was before the Court.  In 1944—ten years 
before Brown—Gunnar Myrdal, in his magisterial study of race in America, 
An American Dilemma, wrote: 
  When we . . . choose to view the Negro problem as primarily a moral issue, 
we are in line with popular thinking.  It is as a moral issue that this problem 
presents itself in the daily life of ordinary people; it is as a moral issue that 
they brood over it in their thoughtful moments.  It is in terms of conflicting 
moral valuations that it is discussed in church and school, in the family circle, 
in the workshop, on the street corner, as well as in the press, over the radio, in 
trade union meetings, in the state legislatures, the Congress and the Supreme 
Court.21 
But how does a judge translate a moral view of the problem of race into 
language serviceable for constitutional adjudication? 
Professor Nelson has offered us a proposed example.  He has drawn our 
attention to the contribution of Frank Michelman—who has for forty years 
written so wisely about the hardest questions of American public law—to the 
intriguing work, What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said.22  In 
that volume, published about three years ago, nine leading constitutional 
scholars have each undertaken to do what I tried to do back in 1959—draft an 
opinion which, while reaching the result that Chief Justice Warren announced 
for a unanimous Court on May 17, 1954, would support that result with a 
stronger and more persuasive line of constitutional argument.  Professor 
Michelman’s approach to the constitutional issues diverges ab initio from the 
approach uniformly pursued by his eight academic colleagues.  His colleagues, 
like the unanimous Warren Court, start by addressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment issues posed by the state cases, and then, having solved those 
issues, tend to treat the Fifth Amendment issues posed in Brown’s companion 
case, Bolling v. Sharpe,23 by the District of Columbia’s segregated public 
schools, as essentially secondary to and derivative from the Fourteenth 
Amendment issues.24  Professor Michelman challenges that approach, stating 
 
 21. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY l (1944). 
 22. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 
2001). 
 23. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 24. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 22, at 124-
25. 
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that he “find[s] that mode of proceeding in these cases to be putting the cart 
before the horse.”25  For Professor Michelman, Bolling is the testing case.  
Addressing Bolling, he concludes that, “after we have taken the constitutional 
text and its legislative history as far as defensible legal argumentation can take 
them” (and Professor Nelson prefaces what follows with the observation that 
the “words . . . easily could have been written by Ronald Dworkin”26): 
[D]ecision . . . finally comes to rest on an attribution of national purpose and 
commitment for which no internal legal-textual or textual-historical 
demonstration can be found.  Decision becomes a matter of attributing or not 
attributing to the Constitution, from its very beginnings, an overriding purpose 
and premise of excluding caste institutions from these shores, a premise that 
most Americans today doubtless would trace to the Declaration of 
Independence.27 
Professor Michelman is, of course, too careful a scholar to suggest that 
citing the Declaration of Independence suffices to complete the analysis.  He 
continues: 
Decision thus also becomes a matter of explaining American affairs of race 
during the Constitution’s first seventy-five years as a visionary eclipse or 
occlusion.  It was an occlusion consisting, while it lasted, in a refusal to 
envision inhabitants of African lineage as belonging at all to the civic company 
of one-size-fits-all civil membership—an accompaniment to the legal 
condonation and normalization of African slavery during those years, wrought 
by laws and judges of this country and of many of its states.  It was lifted, if 
not fully cleared away, as those laws were destroyed, by the momentous events 
of the Civil War and its aftermath. 
  . . . . 
  That is a plausible construction of the United States and our history in the 
respects pertinent to our decisions today, perhaps on the whole the historically 
most persuasive one.  It is nevertheless a contestable construction, and one that 
can hardly claim entire independence of the moral outlook of whoever 
presumes to make it.28 
Professor Michelman’s words—words of one who avowedly “can hardly 
claim . . . independence of [a] moral outlook”—are eloquent, and I would like 
to find them persuasive.  But I do not.  I find it difficult to characterize 
“American affairs of race during the Constitution’s first seventy-five years” as 
merely “a visionary eclipse or occlusion.”  My grubbier historical perspective 
sees in the drafting, the ratification, the launching, and the pre-Civil War 
 
 25. Id. at 125. 
 26. Nelson, supra note 14, at [insert page # (51 in typescript)]. 
 27. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 22, at 130 
(footnote omitted). 
 28. Id. at 130-31. 
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implementation of the Constitution a deliberate readiness, at the national level, 
to protect the institution of slavery while that institution continued to be of 
value to the slave states.  I think Thurgood Marshall had the history right: 
  For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look no 
further than the first three words of the document’s preamble: “We the 
People.”  When the Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not 
have in mind the majority of America’s citizens.  “We the People” included, in 
the words of the framers, “the whole Number of free Persons.”  On a matter so 
basic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, although 
they were counted for representational purposes—at three-fifths each.  Women 
did not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years. 
  These omissions were intentional.  The record of the framers’ debates on 
the slave question is especially clear: the Southern states acceded to the 
demands of the New England states for giving Congress broad power to 
regulate commerce, in exchange for the right to continue the slave trade.  The 
economic interests of the regions coalesced: New Englanders engaged in the 
“carrying trade” would profit from transporting slaves from Africa as well as 
goods produced in America by slave labor.  The perpetuation of slavery 
ensured the primary source of wealth in the Southern states. 
  Despite this clear understanding of the role slavery would play in the new 
republic, use of the words “slaves” and “slavery” was carefully avoided in the 
original document.  Political representation in the lower House of Congress 
was to be based on the population of “free Persons” in each state, plus three-
fifths of all “other Persons.”  Moral principles against slavery, for those who 
had them, were compromised, with no explanation of the conflicting principles 
for which the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly been fought: the 
self-evident truths “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 
  It was not the first such compromise.  Even these ringing phrases from the 
Declaration of Independence are filled with irony, for an early draft of what 
became that declaration assailed the King of England for suppressing 
legislative attempts to end the slave trade and for encouraging slave rebellions.  
The final draft adopted in 1776 did not contain this criticism.  And so again at 
the Constitutional Convention eloquent objections to the institution of slavery 
went unheeded, and its opponents eventually consented to a document which 
laid a foundation for the tragic events that were to follow.29 
 
 29. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1987) (footnotes omitted).  Justice Marshall’s assessment of our 
constitutional beginnings was presented in an address given in 1987, the bicentennial of the 
Constitution.  It is instructive to compare certain observations of Chief Justice Jay in his opinion 
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in which the majority of the Court, over 
Justice Iredell’s dissent, concluded that Georgia, one of the sovereign states constituting the 
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If Justice Marshall was correct in his assessment of the Constitution’s 
regression from the principles announced in the Declaration of Independence, I 
am unpersuaded that the Fifth Amendment—prior to what may be termed its 
enhancement by the post-Civil War amendments—can properly be found to be 
sufficiently freighted with values of equality to support the result arrived at in 
Bolling v. Sharpe.  My non-concurrence in Professor Michelman’s eloquent 
and elegant opinion stems from a view of our history from 1787 to 1860 that is 
less upbeat than his.  Professor Michelman acknowledges that his 
“construction of the United States and our history in the respects pertinent to 
our decisions” is “contestable.”30  So is mine.  Professor Michelman also 
acknowledges that his “construction” is “one that can hardly claim entire 
independence of [his] moral outlook.”31  There is no admixture of moral 
outlook in my construction of the pertinent history.  I wonder whether that 
explains our differing constitutional conclusions. 
 
United States, was suable in a federal court by a citizen of another state.  As was the custom in 
those pre-John Marshall days, each of the Justices wrote a separate opinion.  In developing his 
position, Chief Justice Jay found it useful to contrast the notion of sovereignty in England, vested 
in the person of the ruler, suability of whom in the crown’s own courts was unthinkable, with the 
notion of sovereignty in America, where the people rule—but, as of 1793, as a parenthesis in the 
Chief Justice’s opinion discloses, not all the people: 
It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in 
England, exist on feudal principles.  That system considers the Prince as the sovereign, 
and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and 
excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of 
Justice or elsewhere.  That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and 
authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; 
it is easy to perceive that such a sovereign could not be amendable to a Court of Justice, 
or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint.  It was of necessity, therefore, that 
suability became incompatible with such sovereignty.  Besides, the Prince having all the 
Executive powers, the judgment of the Courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not 
mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is a distinct thing from a capacity to be 
sued.  The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us 
of the distinction between the Prince and the subject.  No such ideas obtain here; at the 
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of 
the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects (unless the African slaves among us 
may be so called) and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are 
equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty. 
Id. at 471-72. 
 30. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 22, at 131. 
 31. Id. 
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